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ESSAY
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR EUROPEAN RACE
EQUALITY LAW: CHEZ RAZPREDELENIE
BULGARIA AD V. KOMISIA ZA ZASHTITA OT
DISKRIMINATSIA, ANELIA NIKOLOVA
Julie C. Suk*
The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU” or “The
Court”) has decided very few cases construing the scope of racial or
ethnic discrimination. The cases that have provided opportunities to
define discrimination and the frameworks for proving it have largely
arisen in the context of Equal Treatment case law prior to the
antidiscrimination directives of 2000,1 and subsequently, in age
discrimination decisions construing Directive 2000/78/EC.2 Despite
continued political contestation around ethnic, racial, and/or religious
discrimination against Roma and Arab and North African Muslims in
various member states, few discrimination cases challenging such
discrimination have been referred to the CJEU.3 Nonetheless, in recent
years, a handful of decisions suggest the Court’s willingness to define
ethnic and racial discrimination under EU law in innovative and farreaching directions.4
*

Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
1. See Regina v. Sec’y of State for Emp’t, ex parte Seymour-Smith and Perez, Case C167/97, [1999] E.C.R. I-666; Enderby v. Frenchay Health Auth. and Sec’y of State for Health,
Case C-127/92, [1993] E.C.R. I-5535; Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Prods.) Ltd., Case 96/80,
[1981] E.C.R. 912.
2. See, e.g., Incorporated Trs. of the Nat’l Council for Ageing (Age Concern England) v.
Sec’y of State for Bus., Enter., and Regulatory Reform, Case C-388/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-1569.
3. See European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Annexes to the
Joint Report on the Application of Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) and the Employment
Equality Directive (2000/78/EC), SWD (2014) 5 Final (Jan. 17, 2014), Annex II (noting that
case-law on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin is less developed).
4. See CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, and
Anelia Nikolava, and Darzhavna Komisia za energiyno i vodno regulirane, Case C-83/14, 2015,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=165912&doclang=EN; Belov v.
CHEZ Elektro Balgaria AD, Case C-394/11, 2013, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62011CJ0394; Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale
della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano (IPES), Case C-571/10, 2012, http://eur-
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This Essay identifies the Court’s antidiscrimination innovations
in its July 2015 decision, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v. Komisia
za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, Anelia Nikolova (“CHEZ”). In a decision
addressing discrimination against Roma in the provision of public
services, the CJEU put forth an expansive definition of indirect
discrimination. The decision, in recognizing a non-Roma plaintiff as a
proper party to complain of discrimination against Roma, also
innovates with regard to standing to enforce EU antidiscrimination
norms. Both the articulation of the indirect discrimination framework
in the direction of scrutinizing the defendant’s justifications, as well as
the expansion of standing to enforce antidiscrimination norms, are
justified by reference to the Directive’s stated purposes. The
prohibition of race discrimination in employment aims not merely to
provide remedies to individuals who are humiliated, but to bring about
democratic and tolerant societies that operate with an ethos of
inclusion.
CHEZ was referred to the CJEU by the Administrativen sad Sofiagrad, a Bulgarian administrative court that had affirmed a decision
against it by the Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia (“KZD”), the
Commission for Protection Against Discrimination. The proceedings
had been initiated by Ms. Nikolova, an operator of a grocery store in a
predominantly Roma neighborhood. Nikolova is not herself of Roma
origin, but she lodged a complaint with the KZD against CHEZ,
claiming anti-Roma discrimination. CHEZ, an electrical power
provider, installed electricity meters for all consumers in the district
encompassing Nikolova’s store at a height of six to seven meters. In
other districts, CHEZ installed electricity meters at a height of 1.7
meters. Because the electricity meters were too high for Nikolova to
read, she was unable to monitor her consumption and unable to confirm
whether CHEZ was overcharging her for consumption on her invoices.
In ruling on her complaint, KZD determined that CHEZ’s practice of
placing the electricity meters at six or seven meters in Nikolova’s
neighborhood constituted indirect discrimination on grounds of
nationality under a Bulgarian statute that had implemented Directive
2000/43/EC.
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62010CJ0571; Meister v. Speech
Design Carrier Sys. GmbH, Case C-415/10, 2012, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?docid=121741&doclang=EN; Runevič-Vardyn v. Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės
administracija, Case C-391/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-3787; Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en
voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn NV, Case C-54/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-5187.
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An administrative court annulled the KZD’s decision, because
Nikolova was a Bulgarian national, and therefore could not claim
nationality discrimination based on the experience of Roma persons,
many of whom may have also held Bulgarian nationality. On remand,
KZD concluded that Nikolova had been directly discriminated against,
on grounds of her “personal situation.” Under the Bulgarian
antidiscrimination statute implementing the EU race directive,
“personal situation” is a prohibited ground of discrimination. KZD,
without referencing race or ethnicity, concluded that Nikolova was
discriminated against based on the location of her business, by
comparison to CHEZ’s customers in other locations whose meters were
placed at an accessible height. CHEZ sought judicial review of KZD’s
decision in the Administrative Court of Sofia. The administrative court
referred ten questions concerning various provisions of Directive
2000/43/EC to the CJEU.
The referred questions took up issues that had previously been
raised and discussed in the Belov litigation before the CJEU a few years
earlier.5 In Belov, a Roma resident of a predominantly Roma district in
Bulgaria had challenged the same practice of placing electricity meters
at six or seven meters, carried out by a different electric power
company. There, the KZD had concluded that the practice was
discriminatory in violation of the Bulgarian statute implementing
Directive 2000/43/EC, and referred several questions regarding the
construction of direct and indirect discrimination, as well as the
compatibility of some provisions of the Bulgarian statute with EU law,
to the CJEU. In Belov, contrary to Advocate General Kokott’s opinion,6
the CJEU deemed the case inadmissible, on the grounds that KZD, the
administrative agency tasked with enforcing antidiscrimination law,
was not a court or tribunal and therefore incompetent to refer questions
to the CJEU.7 In CHEZ, by contrast, it was the administrative courts,
not the antidiscrimination agency, that referred the same questions to
the CJEU.
Several of the questions were clustered around the problem of
defining “ethnic origin” for the purposes of enforcing an
antidiscrimination norm. Ms. Nikolova, the complainant here, never
claimed to be of Roma origin, but she sought a remedy for an injury
that she characterized as a form of anti-Roma discrimination. Is it
5. See Belov, C-394/11.
6. See generally Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Belov, C-394/11.
7. See Belov, C-394/11, ¶ 51.
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coherent for antidiscrimination law to treat such a person as a victim of
ethnic discrimination, to recognize her standing to enforce an
antidiscrimination norm, to conceptualize the injury she complained of
as ethnic discrimination? Doctrinally, the fundamental philosophical
puzzle as to whether a non-Roma person could be a victim of
discrimination against Roma focused not only on the definition of
“ethnic origin,” but also on whether the six to seven meter height of
electric meters required comparison to the height of electric meters in
other districts to state a claim of discrimination, and the nexus of any
disadvantage stemming from the greater height of the electric meters
to ethnic origin.8
It is by no means obvious that a court enforcing, construing, and
interpreting a prohibition of discrimination should recognize a
nonmember of a disadvantaged ethnic group as a victim of
discrimination against that group. Consider, for example, a US court’s
approach to an analogous situation. White male police officers brought
a lawsuit complaining about a racially and sexually hostile work
environment when their white male supervisor harassed their black and
female co-workers and made racist and misogynistic remarks. Even
though the white male plaintiffs were not the targets of this
discrimination, they claimed that the racist and sexist work
environment injured their ability to perform their jobs together with
black and female co-workers. The Fourth Circuit held that the male
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim of sex discrimination, and refused
to recognize their alleged injury as sex discrimination for which they
would have standing to complain.9 At the same time, the US Supreme
Court, in the context of interpreting the antidiscrimination mandate of
the federal fair housing statute a quarter century earlier, allowed white
tenants to sue under the statute to challenge their landlord’s exclusion
of black rental applicants. The white tenants claimed that they were
harmed by discrimination against black rental applicants because they
were deprived of the social benefits of living in an integrated
community.10 These different approaches over the last several decades
in the United States suggest that it is a difficult and controversial
question as to whether a non-member of an ethnic or racial group
8. See Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad
(Bulgaria) lodged on 17 February 2014, CHEZ, C-83/14, Questions 1-4; see also CHEZ, C83/14, ¶ 37.
9. See Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205, 1207-08 (4th Cir. 1998).
10. See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 206-07 (1972).
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should be recognized as a party injured by discrimination against that
ethnic or racial group.
Of course, it has always been a fixed feature of antidiscrimination
law since the latter half of the twentieth century that antidiscrimination
laws are written in race-neutral terms. Antidiscrimination laws protect
everyone, not only members of oppressed minority races or ethnicities,
from race-based discrimination, just as sex discrimination law protects
both men and women from sex-based discrimination. This is why, from
the beginning, whites have been able to invoke legal nondiscrimination
norms to challenge race-based affirmative action programs, claiming
what is sometimes known as “reverse” discrimination.11 Similarly, men
invoke legal nondiscrimination norms to challenge laws that favor
mothers rather than fathers and wives rather than husbands, in the
context of family or social benefits policy.12 Yet, when Ms. Nikolova,
a non-Roma Bulgarian claimed that she was injured by discrimination
on grounds of ethnicity in the circumstances of this case, the structure
of her claim is quite different from a claim of “reverse” discrimination.
She is not saying that a policy that works to the advantage of an ethnic
minority is working to her disadvantage. She is claiming, to the
contrary, that a policy that works to the disadvantage of a minority to
which she does not belong also works to her disadvantage. As the CJEU
puts it, Ms. Nikolova “suffer[s] together” 13 with her Roma neighbors
when they are subject to discrimination on grounds of ethnicity.
In justifying the conclusion that Ms. Nikolova is a proper
complainant, the CJEU painted in broad brushstrokes the “fundamental
principles” underlying its approach. It points to recitals in the preamble
of the race directive that articulate the ambitious social goals of the
directive, to justify a generally expansive approach.14 It states:
As the Court has already held in the light of the objective of
Directive 2000/43 and the nature of the rights which it seeks to
safeguard, and in view of the fact that that directive is merely an
expression, within the area under consideration, of the principle of
equality, which is one of the general principles of EU law, as
11. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 293-300 (1978).
12. For United States examples, see Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S 636 (1975);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Men have also invoked antidiscrimination norms
to challenge special protections for mothers before the CJEU. See Roca Álvarez v. Sesa Start
España ETT SA, Case C-104/09, [2010] E.C.R. I-8661; Hofmann v. Barmer Ersatzkasse, Case
184/83, [1984] E.C.R. 3047.
13. CHEZ, C-83/14, ¶ 60.
14. Id. ¶ 40.
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recognized in Article 21 of the Charter, the scope of that directive
cannot be defined restrictively.15

Thus, the Court urges that the prohibition of discrimination, read
in conjunction with Article 21 of the Charter, “must be interpreted as
being intended to apply in circumstances such as those at issue in the
main proceedings irrespective of whether the measure at issue in those
proceedings affects persons who have a certain ethnic origin or persons
who, without possessing that origin, suffer, together with the former,
the less favourable treatment or particular disadvantage resulting from
that measure.”16
The Court invokes the notion, frequently associated with
justifying challenges to positive action, that Directive 2000/43 is
concerned not with groups, but with grounds for discrimination: “the
principle of equal treatment to which that directive refers applies not to
a particular category of person but by reference to the grounds . . . so
that that principle is intended to benefit also persons who, although not
themselves a member of the race or ethnic group concerned,
nevertheless suffer less favorable treatment or a particular disadvantage
on one of those grounds.”17 The Court notes, citing recital 16 of the
preamble to the directive, that “the protection against discrimination on
grounds of racial or ethnic origin which the directive is designed to
guarantee is to benefit ‘all’ persons.”18
The Court justifies this expansive approach on the understanding
that the race discrimination directive is “intended to ensure the
development of democratic and tolerant societies which allow the
participation of all persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, and it
is to this end that ‘any’ direct or indirect discrimination based on racial
or ethnic origin as regards the areas covered by the directive should be
prohibited throughout the European Union.”19 Non-discrimination is a
principle that promotes a democracy in which persons of various
origins participate together. The court’s decision enables persons
belonging to majority ethnicities to challenge discriminatory practices
against ethnic minorities when they suffer the discriminatory practice
together. Instead of pitting majority against minority,

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. ¶ 43 (citations omitted).
Id. ¶ 50.
Id. ¶ 56.
Id. ¶ 57.
Id. ¶ 65.
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antidiscrimination law can be made to promote solidarity and
integration in democratic participation.
The idea that nonmembers of the disadvantaged group can suffer
together is also acknowledged in the CJEU’s decision in Coleman v.
Attridge Law. In that case, referred by a London Employment Tribunal,
the claimant alleged that she was subject to adverse treatment by her
employer because she was the primary carer of a disabled child.20 The
Court held that Directive 2000/78, which prohibits discrimination on
the basis of disability, was not limited only to people who are
themselves disabled. The prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
disability covered a worker who was the primary carer of a disabled
child, due to the purpose of the directive to combat all forms of
disability discrimination.21
The theory of diverse democracy underlying the Court’s
recognition of Ms. Nikolova as a proper complainant also animates the
Court’s skepticism of the relationship between non-discrimination
principles and rights. Here, CHEZ had claimed that its practice of
placing much taller electrical meters in this predominantly Roma
district could not possibly amount to discrimination because there
existed no substantive individual right to electrical meters of any
particular height. The Bulgarian statute implementing the race directive
had stipulated that “unfavourable treatment” constituting direct or
indirect discrimination was “any act, action, or omission which directly
or indirectly prejudices rights or legitimate interests.”22 If no person has
a right or legitimate interest to begin with in electrical meters at an
accessible height, CHEZ’s provision of short meters in some districts
and tall meters in other districts has no effect on any rights or legitimate
interests and would not register as “unfavorable treatment.” The
structure of this argument is that, when a decision-maker has discretion
(for example, an employer who employs all employees “at will”), it
makes little sense to say that the person has discriminated when he is
exercising the discretion that the law gives him. The Court took the
view, however, that “unfavourable treatment” under the directive did
not require any negative effect on a legitimate interest or right. Rather,
“unfavorable treatment” could include any adverse treatment, even of
a minimally serious nature.23 What matters is that there is treatment that
20. See Coleman v. Attridge Law, Case C-303/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-5603.
21. Id. ¶ 38.
22. CHEZ, C-83/14, ¶ 14.
23. See id. ¶¶ 65-67.
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is “unfavorable” compared to another identifiable person who is not
subject to that adverse treatment or effect.
The Court goes so far as to suggest that, in defining “unfavourable
treatment” as an injury to an existing right or legitimate interest, the
Bulgarian statute is in conflict with the directive.24 The directive
precludes a national provision that makes a prejudice to rights a
necessary condition of a finding of direct or indirect discrimination. In
so pronouncing, the Court is essentially suggesting that coherent,
legally actionable discrimination could occur even without a significant
harm to any particular person’s rights. The main problem of
discrimination as a subject for EU law is not the harm to any
individual’s rights or legitimate interests, but rather, the undermining
of democratic and tolerant societies based on participation on equal
terms. To limit discrimination to prejudice to rights or legitimate
interests would be to define the scope of protection guaranteed by the
directive “restrictively.”25
This approach is consistent with the Court’s prior decisions,
which recognize the possibility of victimless discrimination. In the case
of Firma Feryn, decided in 2008, the CJEU determined that employers
could be held liable for discriminating if they made racially
exclusionary announcements with regard to their intention not to hire
members of certain ethnic groups, even in the absence of a concrete
person complaining about their rejection in a hiring process.26 The
Court embraced the fundamental goals of the Directive: “The objective
of fostering conditions for a socially inclusive labour market would be
hard to achieve if the scope of Directive 2000/43 were to be limited to
only those cases in which an unsuccessful candidate for a post,
considering himself to be the victim of direct discrimination, brought
legal proceedings against the employer.”27
As this statement from Firma Feryn illustrates, this normative
outlook informs the Court’s approach to how the norms should be
enforced. In CHEZ, bold doctrinal innovations emerge with regard to
the concepts of direct and indirect discrimination to enforce and
promote a socially inclusive labor market. In introducing the doctrinal
framework, the Court again emphasizes how the principle of nondiscrimination furthers the goals of the European Union:
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. ¶ 68.
Id. ¶¶ 66-68.
Firma Feryn, [2008] E.C.R. I-5187, ¶ 25.
Id. ¶ 24.
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[A]s is apparent from recitals 9, 12, and 13 in the preamble to
Directive 2000/43, the EU legislature also sought to make clear (i)
that discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin may undermine
the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty, in particular the
attainment of a high level of employment and of social protection,
the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, economic
and social cohesion and solidarity, and may also undermine the
objective of developing the European Union as an area of freedom,
security, and justice and (ii) that the prohibition of any
discrimination of that type which the directive imposes as regards
the areas covered by it is intended, in particular, to ensure the
development of democratic and tolerant societies which allow the
participation of all persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.28

With the understanding that discrimination on grounds of race or
ethnic origin undermines the shared EU social policies, including
employment, social protection, solidarity, and inclusive democratic
participation, the Court sets out the proof framework by which direct
and indirect discrimination can be established in litigation.
The starting point is Article 8(1) of Directive 2000/43, which
provides for the shifting of the burden of proof once a complainant has
established facts from which discrimination can be inferred. On the one
hand, the Court’s jurisprudence has authorized national courts and
other bodies to determine the facts from which discrimination may be
inferred. On the other hand, in this decision, the Court explicitly
determines that indirect discrimination can be inferred as an initial
matter from the facts presented in this case, thereby requiring the
respondent to articulate justifications for the practices that are being
challenged as indirectly discriminatory.
In this case, the referring court asked for guidance on what
constituted an “apparently neutral practice” within the meaning of
Article 2(2)(b) of the Directive. That article defines indirect
discrimination as an “apparently neutral provision, criterion, or
practice” that “would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a
particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that
provision, criterion, or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate
aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and
necessary.” In this case, the respondent suggested that the practice of
placing the electricity meters at a height of six or seven meters was not
an “apparently neutral . . . practice” that put Roma persons at a
28.

Id. ¶ 74.
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particular disadvantage. The reasoning behind this position is that, if it
is alleged that the practice is directly discriminatory against the Roma,
as it was here, that practice is not “apparently” neutral; it is only
allegedly or “ostensibly” neutral. Under this approach, a practice that
could plausibly be directly discriminatory (i.e. motivated by pernicious
ethnic stereotypes of Roma as criminals stealing electricity) should not
be analyzed under the “indirect discrimination” provision of Article
2(2)(b) because its neutrality is not “apparent.” Without explicit
discussion or justification, the Court rejects this construction of
“apparently neutral,” referencing Advocate General Kokott’s
explanation in her opinion. As Kokott explained:
The term “apparently” in Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/43 can
only be interpreted as referring to an ostensibly or prima facie
neutral provision, criterion, or practice. On the other hand, that
term cannot simply mean that the provision, criterion or practice
in question must be manifestly neutral, as the referring court seems
to think. This would have the highly illogical consequence that no
finding of discrimination could be made wherever the provision,
criterion, or practice in question transpires to be “less neutral” than
it may appear at first sight. This would possibly create a gap in the
protection against discrimination which cannot under any
circumstances be intended.29

If “apparently” in Article 2(2)(b) were construed to mean
“manifestly,” the gap in protection against discrimination imagined by
Kokott would consist of the mutual exclusivity between direct and
indirect theories of discrimination for any set of facts. In the instant
case, a complainant would have to choose between arguing that the
meters were installed at an inaccessible height because of hostile ethnic
stereotypes of the Roma and arguing that the meters’ height put Roma
persons at a disadvantage that could not be justified by reference to the
proportionate pursuit of a legitimate purpose.
The Court breaks down the analysis in the following way: if a
measure gives rise to a difference in treatment that has been introduced
for reasons relating to racial or ethnic origin, that measure must be
classified as “direct discrimination” under Article 2(2)(a). If a measure
uses “neutral criteria not based on the protected characteristic,” and “it
has the effect of placing particularly persons possessing that
characteristic at a disadvantage,” it may constitute indirect
29. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, CHEZ, C-83/14, ¶ 92.
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discrimination. “Neutral” cannot mean “nondiscriminatory;” it simply
means not openly based on or obviously motivated by the protected
characteristics of the persons involved. Such “neutral” practices still
constitute “discrimination” when they do not meet the justification
required under Article 2(2)(b).
The Bulgarian statute, by contrast, in effect treated indirect
discrimination no differently from direct discrimination. Although the
statute prohibited indirect discrimination in language similar to that of
Article 2(2)(b) of the directive, it read as follows:
Indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where, on the basis
of characteristics mentioned in paragraph 1, one person is placed
in a less favourable position compared with other persons by an
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice, unless that
provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified having
regard to a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are
appropriate and necessary.30

The key difference between the Bulgarian statutory prohibition
and the Directive’s definition of indirect discrimination is that the
Bulgarian statute imagines indirect discrimination as occurring “on the
basis of” the protected characteristics. Supplementary provisions to the
statute attempted to define the language, “on the basis of characteristics
mentioned.” Point 8 noted, “‘on the basis of characteristics mentioned
in Article 4(1)’ means: on the basis of the actual—present or past—or
the presumed existence of one or more such characteristics possessed
by the person discriminated against or a person connected with or
assumed to be connected with that person, if such connection is the
basis for the discrimination.”31
This language led the Bulgarian administrative court to conclude
that indirect discrimination could only occur under the statute if the
“apparently neutral provision” caused disadvantage “on the basis of”
ethnic origin. On this interpretation, the “apparently neutral” practice
of installing electricity meters that were six to seven meters high would
only trigger indirect discrimination analysis if the practice caused
disadvantage “on the basis of” Roma ethnic origin. To say that an
apparently neutral provision causes disadvantage “on the basis of”
ethnic origin imports the direct discrimination framework into the
30. CHEZ, C-83/14, ¶ 13 (quoting Article 4 of the Law on protection against
discrimination (Zakon za zashtita ot diskriminatsia; “the ZZD”)).
31. Id. ¶ 14 (quoting Point 8 of Paragraph 1 of the Supplementary Provisions of the ZZD).
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construction of indirect discrimination. Indeed, the core of the indirect
discrimination concept is precisely that it can be established with no
direct or conscious targeting of the protected characteristics. Thus,
CJEU notes that the Bulgarian provision goes against the Directive by
defining indirect discrimination in such a manner that “the measure in
question is required to have been adopted for reasons of racial or ethnic
origin.”32
In addition, the Court rejected the suggestion that the “particular
disadvantage” caused by the apparently neutral practice had to be a
serious, obvious, or particularly significant case of inequality in order
to be cognizable under an indirect discrimination theory. The words
“particular disadvantage” do not necessitate any particular degree of
seriousness. Rather, the facts from which indirect discrimination can
be inferred simply require a specific disadvantage resulting from the
apparently neutral practice.
Finally, the Court’s clarification of proportionality analysis in
evaluating a respondent’s justification for the apparently neutral
provision suggests an extremely stringent approach to potential
justifications put forth by alleged discriminators in response to the
plaintiff’s prima facie case. Instead of rejecting CHEZ’s justification
as illegitimate, the Court acknowledged the legitimacy of CHEZ’s
purported aim of ensuring the security of the electricity transmission
network, and left it to the national court to determine whether CHEZ
could raise the height of electricity meters in areas where it deemed
fraud or damage to be more likely in pursuit of this legitimate aim.
Nonetheless, CJEU’s guidance to national courts makes it extremely
difficult to conclude that this particular method is appropriate or
necessary in achieving the aim of ensuring security. The Court first
raises doubts about the nexus between this legitimate aim and the
practice at issue in this case, namely placing the meters at an
inaccessible height in certain districts that happened to be heavily
populated by Roma. CHEZ did not produce any evidence, but rather
claimed it was “common knowledge,” that there were numerous
instances of damage and unlawful connections to electricity meters in
those districts. The Court declared, “In order to discharge the burden
of proof borne by it in this regard, CHEZ RB cannot merely contend
that such conduct and risks are ‘common knowledge’, as it seems to

32.

Id. ¶ 97.
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have done before the referring court.”33 Thus, even when a
discrimination defendant can name a legitimate aim in the abstract in
response to the prima facie case of indirect discrimination, that
defendant must still prove with evidence that the legitimate aim is one
that is worth pursuing in the specific context. Here, it means that CHEZ
has to show that there was a real problem with regard to property
damage and unlawful connections in those districts.
Furthermore, even if CHEZ is able to establish with evidence that
there was real likelihood of unlawful activity on the electricity meters
in these districts, additional elements of the burden of proof remain.
The defendant must prove not only that the legitimate aim is in need of
pursuit in this case, but also that the method chosen (placing meters at
excessively high inaccessible height) is the least restrictive means of
pursuing that aim.34 Here, the Court points to the fact that other
electricity distribution companies have combated damage and
tampering by utilizing new technologies which can monitor instances
of tampering.35 Thus, incorporating new technologies that use
surveillance rather than deterrence seems less restrictive, although
perhaps more costly, and the ultimate determination was left to the
national court.
In this proportionality analysis of whether the means chosen is
necessary and appropriate to achieve the legitimate aim, CJEU instructs
the national court not only to consider the costs and benefits of the
allegedly less restrictive methods of pursuing the legitimate aim;
national courts are also to consider the interests of the people inhabiting
the district. It is interesting to see this consideration pop up at this stage
of the analysis; one could argue that the prima facie case, wherein the
disadvantaging effect of an apparently neutral practice is established,
already speaks to the interests of those disadvantaged. Nonetheless, the
Court notes that the “disadvantages caused by the practice appear
disproportionate to the objectives pursued.” The disadvantages include
not only the inability of the consumer to check and monitor their own
electricity consumption—a problem which not only affects Nikolova
herself, but also the stigma experienced by those who are
disadvantaged because of their Roma ethnicity. The stigma is not
something that Nikolova could be said to experience; nonetheless it
seems to be doing a lot of work in making the proportionality analysis
33.
34.
35.

Id. ¶ 117.
Id. ¶ 120.
Id. ¶ 121.
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lean towards a finding of indirect discrimination. The referring court is
encouraged to consider the extent to which the practice being
challenged “prejudices excessively the legitimate interest of the final
consumers of electricity inhabiting . . . the district concerned, mainly
lived in by inhabitants of Roma origin, in having access to the supply
of electricity in conditions which are not of an offensive or stigmatizing
nature and which enable them to monitor their electricity consumption
regularly.”36
CONCLUSION
CHEZ is an extension of the CJEU’s project of re-conceptualizing
discrimination and what makes it wrong. By diminishing the role of
concrete injuries in creating opportunities for norm articulation by
courts, CJEU also reaffirms why norms against discrimination are
important to the European project. By recognizing the standing of a
non-Roma person to challenge ethnic discrimination against the Roma,
and by refining the indirect discrimination analysis, the Court reaffirms
the maintenance of democratic and tolerant societies as a goal of
Directive 2000/43 and the European Union itself.

36.

Id. ¶ 128.

